



283R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 31, n. 83, p. 283-301, May/Aug. 2020
Investor sentiment and earnings management in Brazil
Caio Vinicius Santos Santana¹
 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4862-3253
Email: profcaiovinicius@gmail.com
Luis Paulo Guimarães dos Santos¹
 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9986-8237
Email: lupa@ufba.br






¹ Universidade Federal da Bahia, Faculdade de Ciências Contábeis, Salvador, BA, Brazil
² Universidade de Coimbra, Departamento de Direito, Coimbra, Portugal
³ Universidad de Salamanca, Facultad de Derecho, Salamanca, Spain
Received on 12.18.2018 – Desk acceptance on 01.21.2019 – 5th version approved on 08.08.2019 – Ahead of print on 12.09.2019
Associate Editor: Eliseu Martins
ABSTRACT
This research analyzes whether there is a temporal association between investor sentiment and earnings management in 
Brazil. Several studies have investigated the determinants of earnings management, such as factors inside or external to 
companies and regulatory requirements, but few have considered personal factors, such as investor sentiment in Brazil. With 
this investigation, it was apparent from the findings that accruals quality is affected by investor sentiment. For participants 
in the Brazilian capital market, this research reinforces the need for a more careful analysis of the results reported by 
companies, since managers, in response to investor sentiment, may manage earnings to inflate accounting profit through 
accruals and influence the market’s ability to price shares correctly. It is evident that accounting choices are much more than 
just financial decisions and are subject to investor sentiments. The effect of investor sentiment should be considered among 
the determinants of future earnings management. A sample of non-financial Brazilian companies that traded shares on the 
Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão (B3) exchange from 2010 to 2016 was used. The investor sentiment index was calculated according to 
the methodology of Baker and Wurgler (2007). For earnings management, the models of Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995), 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005), and Dechow, Hutton, Kim, and Sloan (2012) were used. The estimates were carried out 
through regressions for pooled panel data, fixed, and dynamic effects using the system generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator. Discretionary accruals are positively associated with investor sentiment in the Brazilian capital market, 
in a similar way to markets with greater informational efficiency and notwithstanding the code-law system. Analyzing low 
and high sentiment periods separately, the findings suggest that managers increase accruals after high sentiment and reduce 
them after low sentiment.
Keywords: behavioral finance, investor sentiment, earnings management, discretionary accruals, operational decisions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Investor sentiment can be defined as a personal belief 
of whoever invests regarding future cash flows in risk 
investments that is not warranted by known facts (Baker 
& Wurgler, 2007). The literature also defines it as the 
optimism or pessimism concerning stocks in general, 
and it has been considered as a phenomenon that affects 
future performance expectations for companies (Bergman 
& Roychowdhury, 2008). Investor sentiment varies 
due to heuristics and cognitive and emotional biases 
associated with the processing of information, and these 
psychological factors tend to vary over time for exogenous 
reasons, leading to different speculative appetites among 
traders (Baker & Wurgler, 2006; Barberis, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1998; Bergman & Roychowdhury, 2008; Daniel, 
Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam, 1998; De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers & Waldmann, 1990; Simpson, 2013).
The literature has documented different empirical 
evidence regarding the influence of investor sentiment 
on corporate finance decisions (Baker, Ruback & 
Wurgler, 2007; Gilchrist, Himmelberg & Huberman, 
2005; Miranda, 2018; Polk & Sapienza, 2009), on the 
formation of overly optimistic or pessimistic accounting 
profit expectations on the part of analysts and investors 
(Bergman & Roychowdhury, 2008), and how accounting 
results forecasts affect the relationship between investor 
sentiment and stock returns (Hribar & McInnis, 2012; 
Mian & Sankaraguruswamy, 2012; Seybert & Yang, 2012). 
This last aspect is particularly important because it 
seeks to analyze whether investor sentiment influences 
the sensitivity of share prices to earnings forecasts made 
by investors and analysts, since there is evidence that 
earnings response coefficients (ERCs), a proxy for share 
price sensitivity to profit information, is greater when 
sentiment is high and lower when it is low, leading to the 
positive association between ERC and investor sentiment 
(Mian & Sankaraguruswamy, 2012).
According to Sloan (1996), share prices behave as if 
investors “set” accounting profit, treating its different 
properties in the same way and, consequently, failing 
to distinguish the different properties of the accruals 
and cash flow components that form accounting profit. 
According to the author, distinguishing between the 
effects of these components is important because the 
profit expectations contained in share prices do not 
completely reflect the persistence of higher earnings 
that may be attributed to the cash flow component and 
the persistence of lower earnings that may be attributed 
to the accruals component. Consequently, companies 
with relatively high (low) current levels of accruals tend 
to experience negative (positive) abnormal returns on 
their shares that are concentrated around future earnings 
announcements. This means that companies with a high 
(low) level of accruals tend to report lower (higher) 
future earnings. This behavior makes the accruals 
overvalued, since many studies have documented the 
currently positive association between stock returns 
and accounting profit. 
This phenomenon may be associated with the belief of 
managers that current accounting profit is more important 
than cash flow. A survey conducted by Graham, Harvey, 
and Rajgopal (2005) showed that many financial executives 
see accounting profit as the main metric to be disclosed to 
the external public. According to this study, 59% of those 
interviewed stated that they might avoid starting projects 
with positive net present value (NPV) if that meant not 
obtaining the analysts’ consensus regarding current 
quarterly accounting profit. The research also revealed 
that executives believe that outperforming the analysts’ 
consensus concerning short-term accounting profit 
builds credibility with the market and helps maintain or 
increase their company’s share price. In contrast, Ali and 
Gurun (2009) argue that, in periods of high sentiments, 
investors tend to be more active and pay more attention 
to the different components of accounting profit, leading 
to the mispricing of accruals. Thus, managers have a 
propensity to inflate accruals to exploit their higher value 
in periods of high sentiment, even if this overvaluation 
is temporary and reversed a posteriori. Also according to 
the authors, the temporary overvaluation of accruals may 
have a favorable impact on the remuneration of managers 
in the case of there being incentives contracts linked to 
stock options or a stock bonus. 
Ali and Gurun (2009) empirically examined the 
effect of investor sentiment on the accruals anomaly and 
documented that these are overvalued in periods of high 
sentiment in comparison with periods of low sentiment. 
Simpson (2013) also found evidence suggesting that 
companies use discretionary accruals to report inflated 
accounting profits in periods of optimism in investor 
sentiment, but disclose more conservative results during 
periods of predominantly pessimistic sentiment, as well as 
documenting the positive association between earnings 
management (to avoid reporting negative surprises) and 
investor sentiment.  
Caio Vinicius Santos Santana, Luis Paulo Guimarães dos Santos, César Valentim de Oliveira Carvalho Júnior & Antonio Lopo Martinez
285R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 31, n. 83, p. 283-301, May/Aug. 2020
Together, the findings of Ali and Gurun (2009) and 
Simpson (2013) suggest that investor sentiment can 
impose bias on the accounting results estimates made 
by companies themselves, creating incentives for earning 
management through accruals. However, due to the 
relevance of this topic for the capital market and the 
accounting research agenda, more studies are still needed 
that document new evidence on the relationship between 
investor sentiment and earnings management. 
Some studies have already addressed this subject 
in Brazil, but with divergent and inconclusive results. 
For example, in a preliminary study, Macedo, Pinheiro, 
and Machado (2017) analyzed a group of 60 Brazilian 
companies between 2011 and 2014 and did not find 
evidence of the relationship between sentiment and 
management via accruals. Based on catering theory, 
Miranda (2018) investigated whether companies manage 
earnings by taking advantage of periods of high sentiment 
on behalf of short-term investors and did not find any 
direct evidence of this occurrence, but did document: 
(i) an increase in the level of discretionary accruals 
due to sentiment when companies with a short-term 
investment horizon have revenues growth; and (ii) that, 
when evaluating the isolated effect of revenues growth, 
there was inhibition of the level of earnings management. 
Finally, Miranda, Machado, and Macedo (2018) analyzed 
whether the monitoring carried out by analysts affects 
the relationship between discretionary accruals and 
investor sentiment in the Brazilian stock market and 
found a negative association between sentiment and 
management. 
Therefore, based on the available evidence, it is not yet 
clear whether the relationship between investor sentiment 
and earnings management through accruals exists in the 
Brazilian market. This reinforces the need for new studies 
that address this question in Brazil.
Considering that context, this study investigates the 
following problem: What is the relationship between 
investor sentiment and earnings management through 
accruals in publicly-traded companies listed in Brazil? 
With this, the paper’s main objective is to investigate 
the temporal association between investor sentiment 
and discretionary accruals in publicly-traded companies 
listed in Brazil. That is, it aims to identify if the investor 
sentiment in a particular period is associated with earnings 
management practices using accruals in a subsequent 
period.
For this, it adapted the regression model developed 
by Simpson (2013), where the proxies for earnings 
management are associated with the market sentiment 
index, together with a variety of control variables. In 
addition, it used the methodology proposed by Baker 
and Wurgler (2007) in the construction of an investor 
sentiment index for the Brazilian stock market.
As a country with a code-law system (La Porta, Silanes, 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1998) is concerned, it is appropriate 
to study the Brazilian case, since in this environment, in 
which the capital market is less developed and the legal 
protection of investors is weaker, earnings management 
tends to be more accentuated (Lang, Ready & Yetman, 
2003; Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003). 
Moreover, as factors associated with the specific 
characteristics of countries can affect the way companies 
decide their accounting policies for financial disclosure, 
studying the Brazilian case enables an analysis of 
companies that operate in the same institutional, political, 
and socioeconomic context, ensuring better comparability 
of accounting information, as well as enabling factors 
specific to the company level to be controlled more 
precisely, thus guaranteeing more accurate estimates of 
the relationship that the aim is to identify.
In light of the above, and considering that there is 
evidence suggesting that companies strategically adjust 
their financial disclosure policies in response to the mood 
of investors, a positive temporal association between 
the investor sentiment index and earnings management 
through accruals is expected to be observed in the 
Brazilian capital market. 
In general, the results documented in this study are 
robust and consistent with this prediction. Based on 
the pooled panel data analysis with fixed and dynamic 
effects, using three models to calculate discretionary 
accruals, evidence was documented suggesting that 
earnings management through discretionary accruals 
is positively and temporally associated with the level of 
investor sentiment.
However, additional tests revealed that, when 
periods of negative sentiment indices (proxy for low 
sentiment) and periods of positive sentiment indices 
(proxy for high sentiment) are analyzed separately, this 
association is negative in periods of low sentiment and 
positive in periods of high sentiment. Moreover, the mean 
of the discretionary accruals is negative and positive, 
respectively. These findings suggest that managers use 
discretionary accruals opportunistically to report profits 
that are coherent with the investor sentiment in periods 
of high sentiment and increase profit in periods of low 
sentiment. 
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The development of this study contributes in the 
following ways: it extends the empirical literature and 
helps in the understanding of earnings management 
and its determinants by providing additional evidence 
of the relationship between the investor sentiment 
index and the discretionary accruals of publicly-traded 
companies listed in Brazil; in relation to previous studies, 
it provides a methodological improvement in the estimates 
made by including an aggregate measure of earnings 
management through operational decisions, as proposed by 
Roychowdhury (2006). This control is important, given that, 
according to Zang (2012), managers use the manipulation 
of real activities and accruals as substitutes, adjusting the 
level of earnings management based on accruals and 
according to the level of manipulation of real activities.
By documenting that the mood of investors can 
influence the way companies report their earnings, 
the findings of this study are relevant for participants 
in the Brazilian capital market (analysts, investors, 
and regulators) because they reinforce the need for a 
more careful analysis of the accounting result reported 
by companies, since managers, in response to investor 
sentiment, may use accruals opportunistically to adjust 
accounting profit, inducing investors to overreact to 
accruals and consequently leading to an unwarranted 
overvaluation of the share price. In addition, this study 
indicates to accounting researchers the need to include 
the investor sentiment index in studies on earnings 
management and its determinants. 
Besides this introduction, the rest of this paper is 
structured as follows. The second section presents the 
literature reviewed and used as a basis for the research 
hypothesis. The third section describes the methodological 
procedures used. The fourth section is dedicated to 
presenting and analyzing the results. The paper ends 
with the concluding remarks.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
There is evidence that noise traders do not follow 
the advice of market analysts for investment decisions, 
acting irrationally, as they confuse noise for information, 
which brings inefficiency to financial markets, but also 
prevents rational investors from being able to profit 
exorbitantly with the inefficiency. In addition, noise 
impedes knowledge of the expected return on a stock 
or portfolio of investments (Black, 1986; De Long et al., 
1990).
The unpredictability of the beliefs of noise traders 
creates an environment of disproportional risks in the 
price of assets, enabling them to achieve higher expected 
returns than rational investors, leading to a scenario in 
which there is a series of anomalies (De Long et al., 1990).
Unlike noise traders, rational investors have known 
characteristics, such as aversion to loss, which limit their 
willingness to assume riskier positions and, consequently, 
achieve higher returns. Thus, risk aversion can, in itself, 
seriously limit rational investor arbitrage (De Long et 
al., 1990).
Therefore, while rational investors form their 
expectations about the returns on assets in a rational way, 
noise traders are led by their beliefs (or sentiment), causing 
excessive volatility in asset prices. In general, investor 
sentiment can be defined as a belief regarding future 
cash flows and investment risks that are not justified by 
clear facts (Baker & Wurgler, 2007; De Long et al., 1990).
Despite not being the first paper to explore the role of 
investor sentiment in the stock market, Brown and Cliff 
(2004) developed the most comprehensive study up to that 
point. Expanding the investor sentiment measures used in 
previous papers, they addressed it more comprehensively 
(at least, until that moment), using direct measures created 
based on data gathered regarding sentiments and a set 
of proxies as indirect measures of sentiment, statistically 
examining the causal relationship between the variables 
and investigating the relationship between sentiments 
and subsequent returns in the capital market.
According to Baker and Wurgler (2006), the shares of 
companies with particular characteristics (new, smaller, 
more volatile, non-profitable, without dividends, in 
difficultly, with extreme growth potential, or similar 
characteristics) that are more sensitive to speculative 
demand, those with more subjective evaluations, tend 
to be riskier and more costly for arbitrage and, for that 
reason, are probably more affected by changes in investor 
sentiment.  
The Brazilian literature on investor sentiment is still 
in its infancy. However, there is a need to mention the 
doctoral dissertation of Yoshinaga, in 2009, which provided 
evidence with Brazilian data of a pricing model based on 
a sentiment index built using indirect measures. With the 
research object being the empirical investigation of the 
existence of a relationship between investor sentiment 
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and the expected rate of return on the financial assets 
traded on the Bovespa, the results of Yoshinaga (2009) 
suggest that investor sentiment is a relevant factor in the 
pricing of shares in the Brazilian market.
Previous studies have indicated that companies 
strategically adjust their financial disclosure policies in 
response to investor sentiment, and that overly optimistic 
or pessimistic profit expectations can be formed (Bergman 
& Roychowdhury, 2008; Hribar & McInnis, 2012; Mian & 
Sankaraguruswamy, 2012). This phenomenon can induce 
managers to manage earnings so that the predictions 
regarding the economic performance of companies fit 
or influence the expectations of investors and analysts.
Along these lines, Hurwitz (2017) investigated the 
association between investor sentiment and behavioral 
bias in the annual accounting results forecasts made by 
managers and found evidence that forecast optimism 
increases with investor sentiment and that annual earnings 
estimates are more pessimistic during periods of low 
sentiment. 
Other Brazilian studies are being developed along 
this same line of research. For example, the results 
found by Silva (2010) suggest that the pricing of shares 
is effectively infuenced by market sentiment and that the 
investor sentiment indices used in the study were able to 
predict more accentuated effects over assets with a higher 
annualized risk and lower market value.
Some results in the literature on investor sentiment 
also reveal that when sentiment is high, investors are 
more likely to speculate and for that reason they make 
overly optimistic evaluations of the expected cash flows 
associated with risky assets, whether by overestimating 
the size of the cash flows, or by underestimating the 
risk. Similarly, when sentiment is low, investors make 
overly pessimistic evaluations of expected cash flows and 
undervalue shares (Mian & Sankaraguruswamy, 2012).
This variation in investor sentiment leads to 
the formation of a capital market with speculative 
characteristics for investors, but also opportunistic 
characteristics for managers as they perceive that the 
optimism generated by high investor sentiment provides 
conditions that are conducive to engaging in earnings 
management using discretionary accruals, which derive 
from managers exerting discretionary power over the 
accounting numbers, within the limits of the accounting 
rules, in order to influence perceptions regarding the 
underlying economic facts reflected in the accounting 
result measures (Martinez, 2013; Watts & Zimmerman, 
1990). For this reason, investor sentiment is expected 
to work as an incentive for the capital market to adopt 
earnings management practices. This expectation is 
even greater due to the previously conducted studies 
that report that managers are likely to respond in various 
ways to the expectations driven by investor sentiment, 
such as through investment (real investment, mergers 
and acquisitions), funding (issuing shares, dividends, and 
other securities, procuring financial credits, and capital 
structure), and corporate disclosure decisions (Baker et 
al., 2007; Simpson, 2013).
Previous studies (Ali & Gurun, 2009; Hirshleifer, 
2001; Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003; Libby, Bloomfield & 
Nelson, 2002) indicate that, due to limited attention, 
investors tend not to be very thorough when analyzing 
the components of cash flows and accruals when 
deciding between investment options, which leads to 
the overvaluation of accruals. This lack of attention 
in accruals is even greater at times when investor 
sentiment is high. Therefore, this environment may 
serve to motivate managers to seek to exploit the high 
investor sentiment, by managing earnings and using 
discretionary accruals in order to inflate the components 
of profit (Ali & Gurun, 2009; Simpson, 2013). 
With the aim of examining the relationship between 
investor sentiment and the attempt by companies to 
manage earnings using accruals, Simpson (2013) starts 
from the premise that during periods of high investor 
sentiment managers portray their company in a way 
that maximizes its appeal to that sentiment. For that 
reason, during periods of high sentiment, managers boost 
accounting results using positive discretionary accruals, in 
order to fulfill the optimistic expectations of investors in 
relation to the company’s future performance, suggesting 
a positive association between investors sentiment and 
the use of discretionary accruals by managers.
The results reported by Simpson (2013) reveal that the 
use of discretionary accruals by managers, as well as the 
tendency to meet or outperform the consensus forecast 
of analysts in a quarter, is significantly associated with 
investor sentiment, and these results remain the same 
when control variables are included linked to company 
characteristics: growth, sets of investment opportunities, 
profitability, and hiring variables. In addition, Simpson 
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(2013) documents the greater tendency of managers to 
adopt earnings management practices in response to 
investor sentiment, in relation to stocks that are more 
sensitive to alterations in this. 
The empirical results of Yang, Zhang, and Sun (2014) 
indicate that when managers use earnings management 
through discretionary accruals to increase their results, 
investors quickly recognize the results manipulation and 
become pessimistic, but when managers use earnings 
management via operational decisions, investors remain 
optimistic.
With the aim of examining whether earnings 
management varies with investor sentiment, Park (2015) 
adjusted the methodology of Baker and Wurgler (2007) 
to build the South Korean investor sentiment index. 
Park (2015) finds that South Korean companies are more 
likely to engage in upward earnings management when 
investor sentiment is low or pessimistic than when investor 
sentiment is high or optimistic. In other words, companies 
tend to inflate their earnings in order to increase their 
share prices during bad economic periods. 
Thus, from observing the behavior of companies that 
operate in the Brazilian market, the following hypothesis 
can be developed:
H1: earnings management through discretionary accruals is 
directly associated with the level of investor sentiment.
3. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
The sample chosen for the empirical verification of 
this study consists of non-financial Brazilian companies 
listed on the Bovespa (current B3 – Brasil, Bolsa, 
Balcão). For this, quarterly data were collected from 
Economatica®, covering the period from 2010 to 2016 
and totaling 28 quarters. Quarterly data were used as 
this periodicity ensures that the accounting information 
used in the analysis is compliant with the Accounting 
Pronouncements Committee (Comitê de Pronunciamentos 
Contábeis)/International Financial Reporting Standards 
(CPC/IFRS). With this, it is hoped that the noise that 
can be attributed to the change in accounting standards 
is eliminated.
The use of quarterly accounting information is 
important to maintain compatibility with the measurement 
methodology of the investor sentiment index proposed 
by Baker and Wurgler (2007), besides previous studies 
revealing accounting earnings management practices in 
quarterly results (Brown & Caylor, 2005; Burgstahler & 
Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel & Zeckhauser, 1999; Graham 
et al., 2005; Matsumoto, 2002), as well as the influence of 
investor sentiment over corporate disclosures (Bergman & 
Roychowdhury, 2008) and over pro forma results (Brown, 
Christensen, Elliott & Mergenthaler, 2012).
Discretionary accruals were measured using three 
models: (i) Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) (KS); (ii) 
the performance matched Jones model (PMJM) (Kothari 
et al., 2005); and (iii) Dechow et al. (2012) (DCW). The 
estimates were made by quarter and by economic sector, 
using cross-sectional data and an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimator. In the regressions diagnostic, the leverage 
procedure and DFFITS estimates (automatically calculated 
by the Gretl software) were used to identify influential 
observations and analyze the residuals to detect outliers. 
A more detailed discussion about leverage can be found 
in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) and about DFFITS 
in Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980).
Balance sheets and other key financial statements were 
collected in order to run the models, taking into account 
the particularity of each one. For this, the final sample used 
for the accruals calculation was limited to the restrictive 
nature of these models, as can be perceived in Table 1.
Table 1 
Companies by economic sector and by earnings management model
Economic sector
Companies (n) per model
KS PMJM DCW OCF PROD DISX
Industrial goods 28 44 43 42 39 37
Consumer cyclical 36 56 56 54 56 53
Consumer non-cyclical 12 17 17 17 17 17
Electrical energy 2 2 2 7 7 7
Basic materials 21 27 27 26 27 26
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Oil, gas, and biofuels 4 6 6 6 5 5
Health 4 6 6 5 6 5
Information technology 3 3 3 3 3 3
Telecommunications 2 4 4 4 4 4
Public utility 21 34 33 38 41 38
General total 133 199 197 202 205 195
Observations (n) 3,724 5,572 5,516 5,656 5,740 5,460
OCF = abnormal level of operating cash flow; DCW = Dechow et al. (2012); DISX = abnormal level of discretionary expenses; 
PMJM = performance matched Jones model; KS = Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995); PROD = abnormal level of production 
cost.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
With the aim of measuring the investor sentiment of 
the Brazilian stock market, data from 2010 to 2016 were 
collected, whose methodological details are presented 
below.
3.1 Measurement of the Investor Sentiment 
Index
The methodology of Baker and Wurgler (2007) was 
used with the aim of achieving the purposes of this 
study. By means of it, the principal components factor 
analysis exploratory technique could be used as a method 
for obtaining a common component of six proxies for 
investor sentiment: closed-end fund discount (CEFD), 
share turnover (TURN), number of initial public offerings 
(NIPO), first-day return of initial public offerings (RIPO), 
dividend premium (PDND), and equity share in new 
issues (S).
However, due to the absence of representative data 
for the CEFD proxy for the Brazilian market, this was 
discarded and no other proxy was inserted to substitute 
it, in order to strictly follow the approach of Baker and 
Wurgler (2007). This difficulty was also reported in 
previous studies (Silva, 2010; Yoshinaga, 2009). Table 2 
presents the variables that compose the investor sentiment 
index.
Table 2
Proxies for investor sentiment 
Proxy Equation Equation variables Source
NIPO - - Bovespa
RIPO - - Bovespa
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The higher the value is of the investor sentiment index 
variable (SENT), the more positive or optimistic the 
investor sentiment will be; however, the lower this value 
is, the more negative or pessimistic the investor sentiment 
will be. For the purposes of classifying the groups from 
low to high sentiment, the investor sentiment observations 
were separated, with the negative index observations 
being denominated low sentiment, and the positive index 
observations being denominated high sentiment.
3.2 Detection of Earnings Management through 
Discretionary Accruals
With the aim of detecting earnings management 
practices through discretionary accruals, the KS, PMJM, 
and DCW models were chosen.
The KS model is defined according to equation 1.
( ) ( )1 0 1 1 1 2 2 1/   /  /it it it it it itAB A REV A EXP Aδ δ− − −=∅ +∅ +∅ ( )3 3 1 /  it it tPPE Aδ µ−+∅ +
in which ABit is the accrual balance in period t; Ait-1 is 
the total assets in period t-1, REVit is the net revenue in 
period t, EXPit are the operational expenses in period t, 
PPEit are the fixed assets in period t, and μt is the error 
term of the regression in period t.
The PMJM model is calculated according to equation 2. 1 
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 3 
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In turn, the DCW model is calculated as described in equation 3. 1 
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For the PMJM and DCW models, TAt are the total 
accruals in period t scaled by the total assets in period 
t – 1, ∆REVt is the variation in net nevenues between 
periods t – 1 and t scaled by the total assets in period 
t – 1, ∆RECt is the variation in client receivables between 
periods t – 1 and t scaled by the total assets in period 
t – 1, PPEt are the fixed assets in period t scaled by the 
total assets in period t – 1, TAt-1 are the total accruals 
in period t – 1 scaled by the total assets in period t – 
2, ROAit is the return on assets in period t, Ait are the 
total assets in period t, and εit is the error term of the 
regression in period t.
In this paper, we chose to use the KS model because it 
is one of the most popular ones in research on earnings 
management in Brazil, together with the PMJM model. 
The latter, in its various versions, has also been one of 
the most adopted in international research. The PMJM 
model is an advancement in relation to the original one 
as it seeks to recognize firm performance (measured 
by ROA) in the discretionary accruals estimate, since 
companies with high performance are expected to have 
accruals that are different from 0 (Kothari et al., 2005). 
In turn, the DCW model is the most up-to-date version 
of the PMJM and considers the reversions of accruals in 
the current period.
3.3 Econometric Procedures for Empirically 
Verifying the Research Hypothesis
The empirical model, adapted from Simpson (2013), 
which served to test the research hypothesis, relates the 
investor sentiment index with earnings management, 
considering the temporality with investor sentiment 
together with a variety of controls that, according to 
previous studies, are associated with earnings management 
practices. It assumes the following form: 1 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�� � �� � ��𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆��� � ��𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴���� � ��𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴���� � ��𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆���� � ��𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿����  2 
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in which ABACCit are the discretionary accruals 
measured using the residuals of equations 1, 2, and 3, 
SENTt-1 is the market sentiment index in quarter t-1 
measured as described in section 3.1, MBt-1 is the ratio 
between the company’s market value and net equity, 
ROAt-1 is the proxy for the incentive plan hypothesis and 
is given by the ratio between net income and total assets, 
SIZEt-1 measures the company’s size and symbolizes 
the political costs hypothesis, and is calculated as the 
Napierian (natural) logarithm of the company’s market 
value, LEVt-1 represents the debt level hypothesis and 
is calculated as the ratio between total liabilities and 
net equity, ∆ROAit+1 represents the future variation in 
ROA of the quarter and serves to mitigate concerns 
that the proxies for earnings management capture 
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operational performance, QTR4 is a dummy variable to 
identify the fourth quarter, and R_RM is an aggregate 
measure of earnings management through operational 
decisions and represents the sum of the individual 
proxies of the models developed by Roychowdhury 
(2006) – OCFit, PRODit, and DISEXPt.
The variables that compose this measure were defined 
as follows: 1 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂�� 𝐴𝐴����⁄ � ��� �����1 𝐴𝐴����⁄ � �����𝑆𝑆�� 𝐴𝐴����⁄ � �����∆𝑆𝑆�� 𝐴𝐴����⁄ � ���� 2 
 3 
 4 
in which OCFit is the operating cash flow in period t, Ait-1 
are the lagged total assets in period t for company i, Sit 
is the net revenue in period t, ∆Sit is the variation in net 
revenue from period t to period t–1, and εit is the error 
term of the regression in period t.
The PRODit model of earnings management through 
operational decisions consists of an analysis of the 
abnormal level of production. Thus, the model defined 
by Roychowdhury (2006), chosen in this study, which 
empirically verifies the normal production costs, is defined as 1 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�� 𝐴𝐴����⁄ � ��� �����1 𝐴𝐴����⁄ � �����𝑆𝑆�� 𝐴𝐴����⁄ � �����∆𝑆𝑆�� 𝐴𝐴����⁄ �2 
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in which PRODit are the production costs in period t, Ait-1 
are the total assets in period t-1, Sit is the net revenue in 
period t, ∆Sit is the variation in net revenue from period 
t to period t–1, ∆Sit-1 is the variation in net revenue from 
period t–1 to period t–2, and εit is the error term of the 
regression in period t.
( ) ( )1 0 1 1 1 1/   1/  /  it it it it it tDISEXP A A S Aα α β ε− − − −= + + +
in which DISEXPit are the discretionary expenses in 
period t, Ait-1 are the total assets in period t-1, St-1 is the 
net revenue in period t-1, and εit is the error term of the 
regression in period t.
With the exception of the aggregate measure of 
earnings management through operational decisions, 
implementation of the control variables is also adopted 
by Simpson (2013), Yang et al. (2014), and Park (2015). 
Table 3 shows the expected signs for each one of the 
variables that compose equation 4.
Table 3
Theoretical expectation for the signs of the independent variables of equation 4
Variables Expected sign Reference
SENTt-1 + Ali and Gurun (2009), Simpson (2013)
MBt-1 +
Dechow et al. (1995), Healy and Wahlen (1999), Fields et al. (2001),  Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Simpson (2013)
ROAt-1 – / + Healy and Wahlen (1999), Fields et al. (2001), Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), Cohen and Zarowin (2010)
SIZEt-1 – / + Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), Dechow et al. (2010)
LEVt-1 – / + Healy and Wahlen (1999), Fields et al. (2001), Cohen and Zarowin (2010)
∆ROAit+1 – / + Simpson (2013)
R_RM – Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Zang (2012)
QTR4 – Jeter and Shivarkimar (1999), Bown and Pinello (2007), Simpson (2013)
Note: The variables are described in the text.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
4. RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Descriptive and Multivariate Analysis 
of the Investor Sentiment Index
The first round of the principal components analysis, 
whose aim is to understand the temporality of the proxies 
in relation to the first principal component, used the five 
contemporary proxies and their lags, setting up the first 
stage of the investor sentiment index with 10 factor loadings.
Subsequently, the second procedure was carried out, 
also with the aim of verifying the temporality of the 
contemporary and lagged proxies using the correlation 
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have more correlation with the first stage index, which is 
the first principal component. According to the results 
reported in Table 4, the proxies chosen for the next round 
of the principal components factor analysis to build the 
investor sentiment index for the Brazilian stock market 
are RIPOt, NIPOt, St, TURNt, and PDNDt-1. 
Table 4
Correlations of the proxies with the first principal component (temporality of the proxies)













Note: The proxies are described in the text. Values in bold mean a significant correlation between the proxy for investor sentiment 
and the first principal component.
*, **, *** = test significant at the 1, 5, 10% confidence level, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The second and last round of executing the principal 
components analysis aims to build a simple investor 
sentiment index, using as original variables the proxies 
whose temporalities showed a higher level of correlation 
with the first stage of the investor sentiment. With the aim 
of knowing the degree of fit of using the factor analysis in 
this last round of principal components, an analysis of the 
Bartlett sphericity and anti-image matrix tests was carried 
out. As the results of the Bartlett sphericity test reported 
in Table 5 present a significance level with p = 0.000, it 
is possible to reject the null hypothesis, which supports 
the use of factor analysis.
Table 5
Analysis of fit and commonalities








Note: The proxies are described in the text. Values in bold mean that the variables in the correlation matrix of the population are 
not correlated; that is, the factor anlaysis model is appropriate.
MSA = measurement system analysis.
* = test significant at the 1% confidence level.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
From the results in Table 5, it can be observed that 
the measurement system analysis (MSA) is greater than 
0.50 for all the variables, which ensures the maintenance 
of all the proxies for executing the principal components 
factor analysis. The results in Table 5 also report the 
commonalities found based on the factor extraction, 
which is an index of the total variability explained by all 
the factors of each variable. Therefore, from analyzing the 
results in Table 5, it can be perceived that all the variables 
have a strong relationship with the retained factors. 
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Table 6 presents the eigenvalues results, which, based 
on the latent root criterion or Kaisser criterion, indicate 
the retention of two factors that can explain 81.035% of 
the variance of the data.
Table 6
Eigenvalues of the components of the investor sentiment index
Component Eigenvalue Variance (%) Cumulative (%)
1 2.161 43.218% 43.218%
2 1.891 37.817% 81.035%
3 0.565 11.298% 92.333%
4 0.287 5.736% 98.069%
5 0.097 1.931% 100%
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Finally, the first principal component is defined as 
SENT, which is able to explain 43.218% of the sample 
variance, enabling it to be concluded that it is a relevant 
fraction that captures a substantial part of the common 
variance of the variables. According to the methodology 
of Baker and Wurgler (2007), the procedures adopted lead 
to the following simple investor sentiment index for the 
Brazilian stock market:
SENTt = 0.441RIPOt + 0.439NIPOt + 0.250St + 0.170TURNt + 0.110PDNDt-1
4.2 Descriptive and Multivariate Analysis of the 
Hypothesis Test
With the aim of examining the relationship 
between investor sentiment and earnings management, 
regressions with pooled panel data and with fixed effects 
were run initially. In the main analysis, only companies 
with all the information available between 2010 and 
2016 were included. Thus, the final sample used to test 
the research hypothesis was formed of a panel of 114 
companies and 27 quarters, totaling 3,004 company-
quarter observations. No variable was excluded due 
to discrepant values or the presence of outliers. Even 
though no problems with influential observations or 
outliers were identified, analyses were carried out using 
winsorization of the data at 1-99% and 5-95%. As the 
results of the coefficients of the regressions did not alter 
in terms of significance or sign, we chose to present 
the results considering all the observations available in 
the final sample. Tables 7 and 8 summarize the main 
descriptive statistics and the correlations between the 
variables of the model. 
Table 7 




Minimum Maximum 5% Perc. 95% Perc. Interquartile
SENT -0.027 -0.227 1.016 -1.533 3.543 -1.200 1.575 0.931
MB 0.127 0.759 14.088 -428.100 31.765 -0.571 3.629 1.042
ROA 0.003 0.008 0.045 -0.919 0.433 -0.047 0.042 0.021
SIZE 14.194 14.468 1.887 7.907 19.556 10.809 16.925 2.617
LEV 2.933 2.239 17.035 -321.520 501.200 -1.204 7.036 1.294
∆ROA 0.000 0.000 0.054 -0.762 0.888 -0.037 0.037 0.014
R_RM 0.008 -0.002 0.357 -3.226 2.786 -0.367 0.427 0.053
QTR4 0.258 0.000 0.438 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
KS -0.077 -0.030 1.580 -24.477 9.347 -2.187 1.891 1.240
PMJM 0.000 -0.003 0.133 -1.667 1.185 -0.176 0.195 0.069
DCW 0.003 0.000 0.896 -10.438 11.002 -1.159 1.216 0.504
Note: The variables are described in the text. 
DCW = Dechow et al. (2012); PMJM = performance matched Jones model; KS = Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995).
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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Table 8
Correlation matrix of the variables
SENT MB ROA SIZE LEV ΔROA R_RM QTR4 KS PMJM DCW
SENT 1 0.013 -0.009 0.000 0.029 0.035 -0.018 -0.089*** 0.025 0.033 0.024
MB 0.013 1 0.090*** 0.171*** 0.020 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.084*** 0.013 0.026
ROA -0.009 0.090*** 1 0.342*** 0.004 -0.157*** 0.040* -0.017 0.072*** 0.005 0.049***
SIZE 0.000 0.171*** 0.342*** 1 -0.034 -0.014 -0.051*** -0.003 0.014 -0.010 0.009
LEV 0.029 0.020 0.004 -0.034 1 -0.020 -0.014 -0.012 0.012 -0.002 -0.016
∆ROA 0.035 -0.010 -0.157*** -0.014 -0.020 1 0.054*** 0.061*** -0.008 -0.117*** -0.073***
R_RM -0.018 0.000 0.040* -0.051*** -0.014 0.054*** 1 -0.115*** 0.007 0.029 0.031
QTR4 -0.089*** 0.000 -0.017 -0.003 -0.012 0.061*** -0.115*** 1 -0.012 -0.087*** -0.081***
KS 0.025 0.084*** 0.072*** 0.014 0.012 -0.008 0.007 -0.012 1 0.068*** 0.079***
PMJM 0.033 0.013 0.005 -0.010 -0.002 -0.117*** 0.029 -0.087*** 0.068*** 1 0.862***
DCW 0.024 0.026 0.049*** 0.009 -0.016 -0.073*** 0.031 -0.081*** 0.079*** 0.862*** 1
Note: The variables are described in the text. 
DCW = Dechow et al. (2012); PMJM = performance matched Jones model; KS = Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995).
*** = statistical significance at 1%. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
As Table 7 records, in the three models, the mean of the 
residuals tends toward 0; however, the KS model presents 
a greater dispersion (standard deviation of 1.580) and 
negative mean (-0.077). In the PMJM and DCW models, 
the mean is practically 0 (0.003 and 0.000, respectively) 
and they present almost no dispersion (standard deviation 
of 0.003 and 0.000, respectively). It should be clarified that 
the higher the value of the residuals in absolute terms, 
whether positive or negative discretionary accruals, the 
greater the tendency for earnings management. Positive 
residuals indicate earnings management to increase 
profits, and negative ones indicate earnings management 
to reduce profits.
Table 8 shows that all the proxies for accruals are 
correlated with each other, but the KS model presents 
a low correlation with the others and the PMJM and 
DCW models are highly correlated. This may be due to 
the fact that the last two derive from the Jones model. 
It is important to highlight, however, that the existence 
of a correlation between them indicates convergence 
between the models, even with only the DCW model 
working with reversions of accruals and the KS model 
presenting a negative mean.
The R_RM variable, which represents the aggregate of 
the proxies for management through operational decisions, 
does not have a correlation with the accruals estimates. 
This may be due to the fact that managers tend to substitute 
the former for the latter in their management decisions, as 
foreseen by the literature (Zang, 2012). Also in Table 8, the 
MB, ROA, ΔROA, and QTR4 variables showed a correlation 
with at least one proxy for earnings management, both 
through accruals and through operational decisions. It is 
interesting to note that the R_RM variable is correlated 
with four control variables (ROA, SIZE, ΔROA, and QTR4), 
signaling a potential multicollinearity problem in this 
preliminary analysis. Of the accruals models, DCW is 
the one that most presented a correlation with the control 
variables (ROA, ΔROA, and QTR4). The SENT variable did 
not present a correlation with the management proxies. 
This preliminary descriptive finding is incompatible with 
the research hypothesis.
Tables 9 and 10 report the estimates made using the 
regressions models for data in a pooled panel and fixed 
effects, respectively, adopted to study the relationship 
between investor sentiment and earnings management 
through accruals in the Brazilian stock market.
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Table 9
Pooled regressions [pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)]
Variables
KS Model MPJ Model DCW Model
VIF
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Constant 0.122 0.002 0.023 -
SENTit-1
0.050** 0.008*** 0.070*** 1.077
(0.021) (0.002) (0.015)
MBit-1
0.009*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 1.030
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
ROAit-1
2.313* -0.166 0.146 1.163
(1.350) (0.137) (0.337)
SIZEit-1
-0.015 0.000 0.000 1.161
(0.084) (0.001) (0.008)
LEVit-1
0.000 0.000 0.000 1.005
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
∆ROAit+1
0.800 0.287** 0.795*** 1.032
(0.534) (0.138) (0.307)
R_RMit-1
0.005 -0.013*** -0.013 1.013
(0.091) (0.004) (0.025)
QTR4
-0.047 -0.027*** -0.179*** 1.076
(0.058) (0.007) (0.051)
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.029 0.014
Notes: The variables are described in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions were estimated with robust 
standard errors. 
DCW = Dechow et al. (2012); PMJM = performance matched Jones model; KS = Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995); 
VIF = variance inflation factor.
*, **, *** = statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
As can be noted in Table 9, the coefficient of the 
SENTit-1 variable is positive and statistically significant 
in all the models, denoting consistency of the estimates. 
These findings give support to the hypothesis that 
management through accruals accompanies variations 
in investor sentiment. This may suggest that managers 
act opportunistically, influenced by market sentiment 
and making accounting choices so that the result 
reported in the accounting statements is coherent with 
the level of sentiment perceived. From this perspective, 
the results suggest that managers may increase/decrease 
accruals (income increasing/income decreasing) in 
periods of high/low sentiment using discretionary 
accruals. The evidence found is consistent with the 
results documented in previous studies (Ali & Gurun, 
2009; Simpson, 2013).
Table 10
Panel data regressions with fixed effects
Variables
KS Model PMJ Model DCW Model
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
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Within R2 0.010 0.027 0.014
Durbin-Watson 1.312 2.534 2.151
Notes: The variables are described in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions were estimated with robust 
standard errors.
DCW = Dechow et al. (2012); PMJM = performance matched Jones model; KS = Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995); 
VIF = variance inflation factor.
*, **, *** = statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
In addition, this study also documented, in a consistent 
way, that the coefficient of the QTR4 variable in all the 
regressions used for the PMJM and DCW models is 
negative and statistically significant. This finding is 
compatible with the one empirically documented by 
Simpson (2013) and consistent with the argument that 
the mean of the discretionary accruals should be negative 
in the fourth quarter (Jeter & Shivarkimar, 1999), as 
managing earnings to avoid negative surprises is less 
common in that period and the process for preparing 
annual reports is more rigorous (Brown & Pinello, 2007).
The ΔROA variable presented significance and a 
positive association with the accruals in the PMJM and 
DCW models. This result suggests that the models may 
be temporarily capturing omitted variables correlated 
with the companies’ future operational performance 
(Simpson, 2013).
Finally, the PMJM model was the only one that 
captured significance for the R-RM variable, which 
controls the trade-off between management through 
accruals and real activity. The sign is in accordance with 
expectations. This result is coherent with the expectation 
that managers use the manipulation of real activities and 
accruals as substitutes in earnings management (Cohen 
& Zarowin, 2010; Zang 2012).
Given the dynamic relationship between earnings 
management and investor sentiment, it is natural for 
possible endogeneity problems to arise, caused by the 
omission of relevant variables in the model or even 
simultaneity between the dependent and independent 
variables. In the presence of endogeneity, the estimates 
made using the models for data in a pooled panel and 
fixed effects are not valid due to their estimators. For that 
reason, new estimates were made using the model for 
dynamic panel data with the system GMM (generalized 
method of moments) estimator as this can mitigate 
the endogeneity problem producing more consistent 
estimates. Table 11 summarizes the results.
Table 10
Cont.
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Table 11
Dynamic panel regressions (two-stage system GMM [generalized method of moments estimator])
Variables
KS Model PMJ Model DCW Model
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient

























AR(2) z-test: p-value 0.833 0.812 0.576
Hansen test: p-value 0.300 0.242 0.271
Hanssen-difference: p-value 0.653 0.743 0.770
Notes: The variables are described in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions were estimated with robust 
standard errors. To eliminate second-order serial correlation problems, in the performance matched Jones (PMJ) and Dechow et 
al. (2012) (DCW) models, the dependent variable was placed in four lags on the right side of the regression. The null hypothesis 
of the AR(2) test is the absence of a second-order autocorrelation, that of the Hansen test is validity of the instruments, and that 
of the Hansen-difference test is exogeneity of the instruments. In the DCW model, the dependent variable was included on the 
right side of the regression with five lags. 
KS = Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995).
*, **, *** = statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
As can be observed in Table 11, the SENT it-1 and QTR4 
variables continue to be statistically significant with the 
expected sign. The use of the dynamic panel with GMM 
helps mitigate the endogeneity problem, gives robustness 
to the estimates, and enables it to be demonstrated that the 
findings of this study are independent of the econometric 
approach adopted and support the initial estimates. In 
addition, it reinforces the convergence of the results 
obtained using the PMJ and DCW models. However, by 
treating the endogeneity, these models positively captured 
significance for the SIZE variable, indicating that for 
the companies in the sample, size temporally affects the 
discretionary accruals estimate. This finding is compatible 
with previous studies.
4.2.1 Additional analysis
In the main analysis, we sought to evaluate the 
association between the investor sentiment index and 
discretionary accruals (proxy for earnings management). 
The results found indicate that accruals respond positively 
to variations in the sentiment index. This may suggest that 
managers opportunistically adjust accruals to increase 
them in periods of high sentiment and reduce them in 
periods of low sentiment, for which reason it is important 
to carry out additional analyses to try and find evidence 
of this strategy.
Adapting Simpson (2013), based on the regression 
used in the main analysis, another two were specified. 
A dummy variable was included in one for when the 
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sentiment index is negative (proxy for low sentiment) and 
a dummy variable was included in another for when the 
sentiment index is positive (proxy for high sentiment). 
The intention was to evaluate how the accruals behave 
in periods of high and low sentiment, separately. In total, 
18 regressions were run, one for each accruals model 
and panel data model. The full results were omitted, but 
tables 12 and 13 summarize some relevant information.
Table 12
Partial statistics for the negative sentiment index
Variables
Low (negative) High (positive)
SENT KS PMJM DCW SENT KS PMJM DCW
Mean -0.5688 -0.1254 -0.0102 -0.0479 1.0555 0.0186 0.0208 0.1060
Standard 
deviation




DCW = Dechow et al. (2012); PMJM = performance matched Jones model; KS = Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995); 
SENT= investor sentiment index.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 13 
Partial data from the dynamic panel regressions (two-stage system GMM [generalized method of moments]), including the 
















p-value 0.000 0.000 0.005 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.002
t -3.550 -4.860 -2.870 t 4.210 5.630 3.190
DCW = Dechow et al. (2012); PMJM =performance matched Jones model; KS = Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995); 
SENT= investor sentiment index.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 12 shows that in the observations with low 
sentiment the mean of the accruals in the three models 
is also negative. In contrast, in the group of observations 
with high sentiment, the mean of the accruals is positive. 
Table 13 only shows the statistics of the coefficient of 
the dummy variable included in the regression models. 
As can be observed, it was significant in both scenarios 
and in all the models, but with opposing signs. The results 
suggest that, in the group of low sentiment observations, 
the managers tend to reduce accruals. In contrast, in 
the group of high sentiment observations, the accruals 
positively accompany the sentiment index. A more 
detailed analysis, using quantile regression, dividing 
the samples into five quantiles, confirmed this trend in 
the PMJM and DCW models. In all the quantiles, the 
coefficients of the dummies are significant, and negative 
in the low sentiment scenario and positive in the high 
sentiment scenario. These complementary results were 
also omitted from the article.
Analyzed together, the results in tables 12 and 13 
signal that the companies may adopt upward earnings 
management strategies when the sentiment index is both 
negative and positive. This procedure is coherent with the 
results of the research conducted by Graham et al. (2005), 
who suggest that managers use accruals strategically to 
try to increase the share price in periods of low sentiment 
and to keep the price high in periods of high sentiment.
These results are also compatible with those documented 
in Simpson (2013), as the author identified that in periods 
of low sentiment companies report more conservative 
results and that upward earnings management increases 
with the level of investor sentiment.
However, as Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) 
explain, when sentiment is high, investors are more likely 
to speculate, attributing overly optimistic evaluations 
to the expected cash flows associated with risky assets. 
In contrast, when sentiment is low, investors attribute 
overly pessimistic evaluations to expected cash flows and 
undervalue shares. In this situation, using accruals to 
inflate earnings in periods of low sentiment may be a way 
of mitigating the pessimism of investors and of trying to 
influence the share price upward, since, as Sloan (1996) 
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suggests, the market does not adequately price accruals, 
meaning that in the short term the share value reacts 
positively to the increase in accruals. This scenario may 
explain the results documented in this study.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study aimed to investigate the association between 
investor sentiment and earnings management practices 
via discretionary accruals in the Brazilian stock market. 
It was identified that, in Brazil, managers increase their 
profits in periods after those in which investor sentiment 
was high, but they report relatively conservatively in 
subsequent periods in which investor sentiment was low.
The documented results are compatible with those 
recorded in previous international studies and consistent 
for a variety of econometric models and established 
controls, giving robust support to the hypothesis that the 
general level of investor sentiment is directly associated 
with earnings management through discretionary 
accruals.
Standing out among the implications of the findings 
is the strategic use of discretionary accruals by managers 
with the aim of matching accounting profits with 
investor expectations. Earnings management through 
discretionary accruals feeds back into investor sentiment, 
accommodating expectations and avoiding a surprise 
and break in sentiments. When sentiment is positive, 
managers tend to manage earnings upward (income 
increasing); however, if sentiment is negative, managers 
manage earnings downward (income decreasing).
Investors and analysts need to incorporate the effects 
of behavioral bias over reported profits in order to fully 
understand the value of companies. In addition, as Brazil 
experienced quite a prolonged recession in recent years, 
reported profits should be interpreted carefully during 
economic crises, since investor sentiment may be reflected 
in more conservative reports.
From the study, it was clear that in Brazil there is a link 
between accounting choices and investor sentiment. It also 
reveals the need for boards, auditors, and regulators to 
pay more attention to earnings management to increase 
profits during periods of high investor sentiment. 
Auditors may wish to be aware of managers’ incentives to 
respond to investor sentiment. Regulators might consider 
increasing financial scrutiny when the entire market 
sentiment is higher, since it is precisely in these periods 
that managers have a higher probability of resorting to 
earnings management to increase profits.
In summary, in light of the findings, the study is 
useful for deepening the understanding of the effect of 
investor sentiment on earnings management. Besides 
having implications for investors, regulatory bodies, 
and gatekeepers, it provides evidence regarding the 
incentives that may induce managers to engage in 
earnings management practices. In addition, as a marginal 
contribution, it demonstrates that earnings quality in 
Brazil is partially affected by investor sentiment.
Finally, we suggest that future studies investigate 
whether there is a relationship between investor sentiment 
and earnings management through operational decisions. 
This study showed that accruals quality is affected by 
investor sentiment, but the effect of investor sentiment on 
earnings management through operational decisions is a 
research question that remains to be addressed in Brazil.
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